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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Florencio Rolan appeals the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s denial of his 
petition for habeas corpus.  Rolan was convicted of 
                                                     
* Hon. John E. Jones III, District Judge, United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
sitting by designation.  
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murdering Paulino Santiago in 1984.  His original petition for 
habeas corpus sought relief based on his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The District Court granted the petition, 
and we affirmed.  After a retrial, the jury convicted Rolan of 
murder again.  He submitted a petition seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus.  The District Court denied the petition.  Rolan 
now appeals.  For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 1984, Florencio Rolan was convicted of first degree 
murder and possession of an instrument of crime in the 1983 
shooting death of Paulino Santiago (“Paulino” or “Santiago”).  
The Superior Court summarized the events surrounding the 
shooting and leading up to Rolan’s arrest as follows: 
On the evening of Friday, May 13, 1983, 
the victim, Paulino Santiago, and Robert 
Aponte were selling marijuana near 17th and 
Wallace Streets in Philadelphia. Paulino’s 
brother, Francisco, and [Rolan] were nearby, 
among a crowd estimated at thirty to fifty 
people.  Around 8:30 P.M. a driver pulled up to 
buy a “nickel bag,” five dollars worth of 
marijuana. Aponte and Paulino Santiago argued 
over who should get the money for the sale. 
[Rolan] sided with Aponte, his cousin. The 
argument continued for about fifteen minutes 
until [Rolan] departed for the house of a friend 
across the street. Francisco Santiago went to an 
abandoned house, at 1629 Wallace Street, a few 
doors from the corner, to relieve himself. His 
brother followed. 
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 It is undisputed that a few minutes later, 
inside the abandoned house,  [Rolan] killed 
Paulino Santiago with a single shot to the chest 
from a .22 caliber rifle, then fled out a back 
alley and left the neighborhood. Police found 
the rifle in the alley about a block away from 
the abandoned house. The next day [Rolan] fled 
to New York City, and was not apprehended 
until the following November, when he returned 
to Pennsylvania after waiving extradition. 
Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). 
During the trial, Francisco Santiago, the victim’s 
brother, testified that Rolan argued with Paulino on a street 
corner.  After arguing outside, Francisco testified that he and 
Paulino entered an abandoned house nearby and that Rolan 
followed, carrying a rifle.  Rolan demanded money from 
Paulino.  Rolan then shot Paulino and ran out of the house.   
Another witness, Edwin Rosado, provided contrasting 
testimony.  Rosado stated that Paulino entered the abandoned 
house after Rolan, not before.  Rolan did not testify at trial.  
The jury convicted Rolan and sentenced him to death.  Rolan 
appealed.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction on October 18, 1988.   
In 1996, Rolan filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s 
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).  Rolan testified at the 
PCRA hearing that Paulino entered the house after he was 
already inside, and charged at him with a kitchen knife.  
Rolan also testified that he entered the house unarmed, but 
found a loaded rifle lying on the floor of the house, picked it 
up, and fired at Santiago in self-defense.  He also testified that 
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trial counsel, Melvin Goldstein, failed to investigate two 
witnesses who would have bolstered a self-defense theory: 
Daniel Vargas and Robert Aponte.   
Vargas testified at the PCRA hearing.  According to 
Vargas, Rolan entered the house unarmed, after which 
Paulino ran into the house with a kitchen knife in hand 
threatening to kill him.  The PCRA court held that Goldstein 
had been constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase of 
the trial and vacated Rolan’s death sentence.  After a penalty 
phase retrial, the jury sentenced him to life in prison.  The 
Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied allocatur.   
In 2001, Rolan filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court.1
The Commonwealth retried Rolan in 2007.  By that 
time, many of the key witnesses had passed away.  The prior 
testimony of those now unavailable witnesses was read into 
the record.  During the prosecutor’s closing argument, he 
  The District 
Court granted the habeas petition, holding, among other 
things, that Goldstein had provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to investigate Vargas’s testimony and 
failing to call him as a witness.  This Court affirmed the 
District Court’s decision granting Rolan’s writ of habeas 
corpus.  See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 683 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
                                                     
1 Rolan’s 2001 federal habeas petition was stayed pending the 
result of the re-sentencing trial.   In May 2004, after the jury 
re-sentenced Rolan to life in prison, the District Court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on Rolan’s habeas petition. 
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highlighted Vargas’s absence from the 1984 trial and his 
(Vargas’s) failure to testify until the 1996 PCRA hearing.  
The trial court instructed the jury that both Rolan and the 
Commonwealth knew of Vargas at the first trial, but that 
Rolan’s counsel failed to call him as a witness.  The trial 
court did not explain to the jury that Rolan’s failure to call 
Vargas, at the first trial, was due to his trial counsel’s 
ineffectiveness, as Rolan had requested.  Rolan was convicted 
of first degree murder and possession of an instrument of 
crime.  He received a sentence of life imprisonment.   
Rolan appealed the second conviction.  The Superior 
Court ordered him to file a Concise Statement of Matters 
Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 1925(b) (“Rule 1925(b) statement”).  
Rolan filed the Rule 1925(b) statement.  The Superior Court 
rejected all of the claims appearing in his Rule 1925(b) 
statement and affirmed the trial court.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rolan, 964 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).  Rolan did not 
seek allocatur in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and did not 
file a PCRA petition.   
In November 2008, Rolan filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
petition for habeas corpus in the District Court.  The 
Magistrate Judge assigned to the matter recommended in her 
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that Rolan’s petition 
for habeas corpus be denied.  Specifically, the Magistrate 
Judge (largely referencing the Superior Court’s substantive 
analysis) held, inter alia, that:  (1) Rolan’s claim of a due 
process violation based on the prosecutor’s closing argument, 
regarding Vargas’s failure to come forward earlier, was 
procedurally defaulted and, in the alternative, adopted the 
Superior Court’s merits analysis denying the claim; (2) the 
Superior Court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s comments 
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regarding Rolan’s failure to raise self-defense during the first 
trial were not improper was neither contrary to, nor an 
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent; (3) 
the Superior Court’s rejection of Rolan’s prosecutorial 
misconduct claim relating to the prosecutor’s comments about 
his post-arrest silence was neither contrary to, nor an 
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent; (4) 
the Superior Court’s determination that Francisco Santiago’s 
prior testimony was properly admitted at trial was neither 
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme 
Court precedent; and (5) Rolan’s claim regarding the 
prosecutor’s alleged misrepresentation of key facts and 
impermissible comments on inadmissible evidence was 
procedurally defaulted and, therefore, not subject to habeas 
review. 
The District Court approved and adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s R&R by order dated November 2, 2010.  
Rolan filed a timely appeal.  We granted a certificate of 
appealability only as to the following issues:   
(1) Appellant’s arguments arising out of the 
prosecutor’s statements regarding Daniel 
Vargas’s failure to come forward earlier; (2) 
whether the prosecutor’s statements regarding 
Appellant’s failure to mount a self-defense case 
theory until 1996 constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct; (3) whether the prosecutor’s 
comments regarding Appellant’s post-arrest 
silence (but not his failure to testify at trial) 
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination; (4) whether the introduction 
of Francisco Santiago’s prior testimony was a 
violation of Rolan’s Confrontation Clause 
8 
 
rights; and (5) whether the prosecutor’s various 
alleged misstatements of the evidence in closing 
arguments rose to the level of a due process 
violation. 
App. at 2a. 
II.  JURISDICTION  
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2253.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
District Court’s final order denying the petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253(c)(1)(A).   
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A.  Procedural Default Challenges 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires that a habeas petitioner 
exhaust the remedies available in the state courts before a 
federal court can exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over his 
claim.  In order for Rolan to fulfill this requirement, he must 
have presented both the factual and legal substance of his 
claims in the state court’s highest tribunal.  See Castille v. 
Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989).  Procedural default occurs 
when a claim has not been fairly presented to the state courts 
(i.e., is unexhausted) and there are no additional state 
remedies available to pursue, see Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 
218, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2001); or, when an issue is properly 
asserted in the state system but not addressed on the merits 
because of an independent and adequate state procedural rule, 
see McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999).    
“Ordinarily, violation of firmly established and regularly 
followed state rules . . . will be adequate to foreclose review 
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of a federal claim.  There are, however, exceptional cases in 
which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders 
the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal 
question.”  Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
B.  AEDPA Deference 
If the claim was not procedurally defaulted, and was 
adjudicated on the merits by the state court, we afford the 
state court’s determinations deference under AEDPA.  In 
doing so, we determine whether the state court’s 
determinations, 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 
resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.   
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
Absent adjudication on the merits, our review of the 
claim is de novo.  Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 
2008).       
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Rolan’s claims before this Court consist of three 
prosecutorial misconduct claims, a Fifth Amendment claim 
and a Confrontation Clause claim. We will address each of 
these claims in turn. 
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A.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 Rolan argues that his conviction should be vacated 
based on (1) the prosecutor’s statements regarding Vargas’s 
failure to testify earlier in the case (“Vargas statements 
claim”); (2) the prosecutor’s comments about Rolan’s failure 
to assert the self-defense theory until 1996 (“self-defense 
statements claim”); and (3) the prosecutor’s alleged 
misstatements of evidence in his closing argument 
(“misstatements of evidence claim”).  The District Court, 
adopting the Superior Court’s conclusions, held that Rolan’s 
claims regarding the prosecutor’s comments about Vargas 
and alleged misstatements of evidence were procedurally 
defaulted.2
1.  Procedural Default Issues 
  Rolan now appeals the procedural default 
conclusions as well as the District Court’s determination that 
his prosecutorial misconduct claims each lack merit.   
The District Court held that Rolan’s Vargas statements 
claim was waived due to an independent and adequate state 
procedural ground—specifically, Pennsylvania Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 1925(b), which requires the appellant to 
file a concise statement of the matters complained of on 
appeal.  The Superior Court and District Court both held that 
Rolan had not asserted the Vargas statements claim in his 
Rule 1925(b) statement, and therefore, waived any relief 
based on those claims.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 
A.2d 15, 25-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (“Where the trial court 
                                                     
2  We do not address procedural default for the self-defense 
statements claim as both the Superior Court and the District 
Court addressed this issue on the merits. 
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orders an Appellant to file a concise statement of matters 
complained of on appeal under Rule 1925(b), any issue not 
contained in that statement is waived on appeal”).   
Rolan argues that paragraph 2 of his Rule 1925(b) 
statement sufficiently conveys his concerns about the 
prosecutor’s statements regarding Vargas’s testimony.3
                                                     
3 Paragraph 2 of Rolan’s Rule 1925(b) statement states, 
  
While we acknowledge that he raises this claim within the 
context of a broader argument regarding the trial court’s jury 
instructions, we find that his Rule 1925(b) statement was 
sufficient to allow the court to identify his claims relating to 
the prosecutor’s statements about Vargas in his closing 
arguments.  See Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 37 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“Pa. R. A. P. 1925 is intended to aid 
trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues 
which the parties plan to raise on appeal.”); see also 
2.  The Court erred in not instructing the jury 
that the federal court of appeals had held that 
[Petitioner’s] original trial counsel was 
ineffective for not calling Daniel Vargas as a 
self defense witness at [Petitioner’s] original 
trial, after the prosecutor had repeatedly argued 
in his closing argument that the jury should 
discredit Vargas’s testimony because he did not 
testify on [Petitioner’s] behalf until more than 
ten years after his original trial. (Id.) 
 
See Commonwealth v. Rolan, No. CP-51-CR-0228931-1984, 
slip op. at 5-7 (C.C.P. Phila. Cnty., May 31, 2007). 
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Commonwealth v. Butler, 756 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000) (“When the trial court has to guess what issues an 
appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful 
review.”).  Therefore, Rolan “substantially, if imperfectly,” 
complied with the requirements of Rule 1925(b).  Lee, 534 
U.S. at 366-67.  Consequently, Rolan’s claim concerning the 
Vargas statements was not procedurally defaulted.  The 
District Court’s procedural default determination on this point 
is erroneous; thus, the issue is preserved for our review. 
The District Court (adopting the Superior Court’s 
rationale) also held that Rolan had waived his misstatement of 
evidence claim for failing to comply with Rule 2119(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure ( “Rule 
2119(a)”).  Rule 2119(a) states, “[t]he argument shall be 
divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; 
and shall have at the head of each part . . . the particular point 
treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 
authorities as are deemed pertinent.”  Here, we must consider 
whether the Superior Court’s application of Rule 2119(a) is 
appropriate for precluding federal habeas review.  See Lee, 
534 U.S. at 376.   
Rolan’s brief before the Superior Court provided 
detailed factual allegations with copious citations to the 
record.  Rolan explicitly stated that the prosecutor 
misrepresented important pieces of evidence in his closing 
argument; pointed to fifteen examples of alleged misstated 
evidence, with citations to the record; incorporated the 
statement of facts into his argument section by reference and 
included a nine-page discussion on the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  In support of his misstatements of evidence 
claim, Rolan cited cases where the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reversed convictions based on an improper remark in 
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closing arguments, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 861 
A.2d 894, 896-98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Commonwealth v. 
Toth, 314 A.2d 275, 277-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974), and 
emphasized the cumulative effect of the numerous statements 
identified in the facts section.  Although Rolan did not 
provide a verbatim recitation of each alleged misstatement in 
the argument section of his brief, he did provide ample notice 
of the nature of his claims by identifying the specific facts 
involved in the misstatements of evidence claim.   
Rolan’s discussion sufficiently identified his claim for 
the court.  Given Rolan’s substantial compliance with Rule 
2119(a), procedural default is not appropriate.  Therefore, the 
Superior Court’s application of Rule 2119(a) should not 
preclude our consideration of Rolan’s federal habeas claim.  
The District Court’s procedural default determination on this 
ground is in error; consequently, this issue is preserved for 
our review. 
2.  Prosecutorial Misconduct Merits Analysis 
Before considering the merits of Rolan’s claims, we 
must first determine the appropriate standard of deference.  
Rolan asserts that AEDPA deference does not apply to the 
state court determinations regarding the Vargas statements 
claim because the state court never adjudicated the claim on 
the merits.  Rather, the Superior Court (and later the District 
Court adopting the same rationale) dismissed his claim as 
defaulted under Rule 1925(b), and then found in the 
alternative, that his claim lacked merit.  We must now 
determine whether AEDPA deference applies when a state 
court decides a claim on procedural grounds and, 
alternatively, on the merits.     
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The weight of authority of our sister circuits suggests 
that the merits analysis is owed AEDPA deference.  See 
Stephens v. Branker, 570 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(“[W]e agree with our sister circuits that an alternative merits 
determination to a procedural bar ruling is entitled to AEDPA 
deference.”); Brooks v. Bagley, 513 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (“[W]e must consider whether the court’s 
alternative merits ruling receives AEDPA deference.  We 
think that it does. The language of the statute does not draw a 
distinction between cases involving alternative rulings; it 
refers broadly to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 
in State court proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted))4
                                                     
4 In Brooks, the Sixth Circuit articulated a thoughtful analysis, 
justifying its application of AEDPA deference to alternative 
merits decisions:  
; see also Zarvela v. Artuz, 364 F.3d 415, 
While the state court of appeals need not have 
addressed the claim on the merits once it 
identified a procedural bar, it surely had the 
authority to do so as an additional ground for 
decision-making this additional ground no less 
a “claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
State court proceedings” than if the case had not 
presented a procedural-bar issue at all. In this 
respect, we see no material difference between 
this type of alternative ruling and another one – 
where a state court offers alternative merits 
grounds for rejecting a claim. Here, for 
example, the state court ruled that Brooks failed 
to satisfy the deficient-performance and 
prejudice prongs of an ineffective-assistance 
claim, even though it need only have 
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determined that Brooks failed to satisfy just one 
of these prongs to resolve the claim. Yet it 
would be strange to say that just one of these 
contentions was resolved on the merits or, 
worse, that neither one was. See Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, (2003) (applying 
AEDPA deference to those prongs of Strickland 
that the state courts “reached”). 
This interpretation, moreover, would 
seem to favor judicial practices that in the main 
will benefit both sides in criminal cases. It is the 
rare criminal defendant who would prefer that 
the state courts not reach the merits of his 
constitutional claim. And it is the rare State that 
would object to a state court ruling that offers 
an additional ground for denying the defendant 
relief. Above all, this practice will “show a 
prisoner . . . that it was not merely a procedural 
technicality that precluded him from obtaining 
relief.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 
(2002). Just as a state court wishing to invoke 
an independent and adequate state ground to 
dispose of a case “need not fear reaching the 
merits of a federal claim in an alternative 
holding,” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 
n.10 (1989) (emphasis omitted); see also White 
v. Schotten, 201 F.3d 743, 750-51 (6th Cir. 
2000), overruled on other grounds by Lopez v. 
Wilson, 426 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 
so it need not fear losing the benefit of the 
doubt that AEDPA gives to state court rulings 
whenever it invokes an independent and 
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417 (2d Cir. 2004); Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 721 n.14 
(5th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1192 
(10th Cir. 2002).     
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Reed, 489 
U.S. 255 (1989) provides additional guidance on this point.  
In Harris, the Supreme Court considered the application of 
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine to claims 
on habeas review and held that state courts may both rely on 
state procedural bars and reach federal substantive questions 
in denying habeas relief:   
Moreover, a state court need not fear 
reaching the merits of a federal claim in an 
alternative holding.  By its very definition, the 
adequate and independent state ground doctrine 
requires the federal court to honor a state 
holding that is a sufficient basis for the state 
court’s judgment, even when the state court also 
relies on federal law.  See Fox Film Corp. v. 
Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).  Thus, by 
applying this doctrine to habeas cases, Sykes 
curtails reconsideration of the federal issue on 
federal habeas as long as the state court 
explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as 
a separate basis for decision.  In this way, a 
state court may reach a federal question without 
sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, 
                                                                                                                       
adequate state ground as an alternative holding. 
Brooks, 513 F.3d at 624. 
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and comity. 
Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10.  This language suggests that 
where a holding provides sufficient basis for the state court’s 
judgment, it should be upheld by the federal court.  The 
Supreme Court’s language does not limit the federal court’s 
consideration based upon whether such state court 
articulations form the primary basis for its decision, or an 
alternative and sufficient basis for the decision.5
We similarly believe that in referencing “adjudication 
on the merits,” AEDPA draws no such distinction for 
alternative rulings.  Rather, it suggests that where a state court 
has considered the merits of the claim, and its consideration 
provides an alternative and sufficient basis for the decision, 
such consideration warrants deference.  Consequently, after 
considering our sister circuits’ analyses alongside the 
Supreme Court’s articulation in Harris, we will apply 
AEDPA deference to the Superior Court’s alternative holding 
on the merits of Rolan’s claim.
   
6
                                                     
5 We note that this is consistent with our decisions in Albrecht 
v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 116 (3d Cir. 2007), in which we 
applied AEDPA’s deferential standard of review to a claim 
that the state courts had found waived, but went on to address 
in the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, and in Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 239-40 (3d 
Cir. 2004), in which we applied AEDPA’s deferential 
standard of review to a state court decision where the state 
court determined that it lacked jurisdiction, but went on to 
address the merits. 
      
6 Because the Superior Court considered all three of Rolan’s 
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When analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, 
the key question is whether a state prosecutor’s comments to 
the jury “so infec[ted] the trial with unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.”  Greer v. Miller, 
483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  More specifically, a “reviewing court must 
examine the prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in 
light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, 
the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of 
evidence against the defendant.”  Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 
95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Rivas, 493 
F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A mistrial is not required 
where improper remarks were harmless, considering their 
scope, their relation to the context of the trial, the 
ameliorative effect of any curative instructions and the 
strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” (citations 
omitted)).  Invoking this standard, we address each 
prosecutorial misconduct claim in turn. 
In his closing, the prosecutor made the following 
statements regarding Vargas’s failure to testify at the previous 
trial:  
Danny Vargas in 1984, characterized as 
an alibi witness, didn’t want to cooperate, didn’t 
want to give a statement, didn’t want to testify.  
Then thirteen years later, thirteen years 
later,—can you imagine this?—in 1996, they 
                                                                                                                       
prosecutorial misconduct claims on the merits, we will apply 
AEDPA deference in our review of the merit determinations 
of each claim.   
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parachute him in out of nowhere to say, oh, this 
was self-defense, I saw Paulino Santiago with a 
knife. . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . And the only thing that was missing 
from Danny Vargas’s testimony thirteen years 
after the crime were four little words:  Once 
upon a time.  Once upon a time. Because if ever 
there was a fairy tale being spun in a court of 
law by a witness, it was spun in 1996 by Danny 
Vargas.  Thirteen years later it was fairy tale 
time.  
. . . .  
Now, the defendant was arrested in . . . 
November of ‘83.  We have these proceedings 
in ‘84.  Vargas knows they’re going on because 
the DA detective goes out to interview him as a 
possible witness for the defendant.  And yet he 
doesn’t come to court, doesn’t testify, doesn’t 
tell the defendant or his family anything about 
seeing the victim with a knife.  Their witness.  
. . . . 
. . . . Where has he been for thirteen 
years, until he finally takes the stand and 
testifies at the proceedings in ‘96? 
. . . . [H]ow do they even know thirteen 
years later to go speak to Mr. Vargas and take 
his affidavit?  Are they psychic?  Are you guys 
20 
 
psychic, that you somehow just know?  What 
did you find, the phone book and look through 
it for all the Hispanic names and say Danny 
Vargas, this is a guy that might know 
something, let’s go talk to him? . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . . [Vargas’s 1996 affidavit] was the 
very first time anyone ever heard from Danny 
Vargas.  
The very first time we have anything 
from Danny Vargas is in February of 1996 
when he completes and signs under oath by a 
notary public this affidavit setting forth these 
facts, deposing these facts which he testified to 
in ‘96 when he testified were true, accurate and 
correct to the best of his information and belief. 
App. at 1108a-1116a.   
These comments were intended to convince the jury 
that Vargas’s testimony was unreliable because he did not 
immediately come forward.  However, Rolan avers that the 
comments were misleading because the jury was never told 
that this Court had found trial counsel, Goldstein, to be 
ineffective for not investigating Vargas as a witness.  
According to Vargas, the Commonwealth should not have 
been allowed to comment on Vargas’s failure to testify 
without attributing the absence to the prior ineffective 
assistance of counsel ruling.7
                                                     
7 Rolan argues that the trial court infected the second trial 
  Vargas also argues that the trial 
21 
 
court’s failure to provide a sufficient curative instruction 
further exacerbated the impact of the prosecutor’s comments.8
                                                                                                                       
with the errors from the first trial by allowing the prosecutor 
to reference Vargas’s failure to come forward earlier.  He 
suggests that our prior ineffective assistance finding extends 
to future proceedings and prohibits any further reference to 
the error.  Rolan further asks that we grant a retrial to allow 
him to be tried without reference to Vargas’s prior failure to 
testify.  We find no such meaning in our prior decision.   
  
In our 2006 decision, we held that Goldstein’s failure to 
conduct a pretrial investigation after Rolan provided him with 
Vargas and Aponte’s names, and his subsequent failure to 
present a self-defense theory of the case “fell below the 
objective standard of reasonableness.”  Rolan, 445 F.3d at 
682.  At the time of the second trial, counsel not only 
conducted an investigation, but also presented testimony in 
support of a self-defense theory of the case.  Additionally, the 
alleged improper comments about Vargas were directed at his 
decision to come forward years after the shooting, thus 
providing information about the sequence of events, not 
Goldstein’s prior inadequacies.  Therefore, we reject Rolan’s 
assertion that our prior findings were so broad that a second 
trial with the benefit of Vargas’s testimony and a self-defense 
claim would still harbor effects of Goldstein’s prior 
ineffectiveness.       
8 We note that Rolan did not move for a mistrial when the 
Commonwealth referenced Vargas’s absence.  Rather, he 
only asked for a curative instruction and made no formal 
objection to the instruction provided by the trial court.  In 
light of these facts, we question the extent to which Rolan has 
properly preserved this claim.   
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Vargas’s assertion that our prior ineffective assistance of 
counsel finding bears any impact on the second trial is 
without merit.  We will, however, consider his due process 
claim, and determine whether the District Court properly 
found there to be no constitutional violation. 
Considered in the context of the entire trial, the 
prosecutor’s statements did not infect the trial with unfairness 
so as to constitute a denial of due process.  See Greer, 483 
U.S. at 765.  The prosecutor’s comments focused on the fact 
that Vargas failed to come forward with his version of the 
events for thirteen years.  Although Rolan attempts to ascribe 
Vargas’s prior absence solely to Goldstein’s ineffectiveness, 
Vargas’s testimony suggests that he made a personal decision 
not to provide additional information at the early stages of the 
case.  When approached by law enforcement in May of 1984 
(as a possible alibi witness for Rolan), Vargas did not disclose 
that he had information about the case and stated that he was 
not willing to provide a statement.  He further testified that he 
did not tell anyone what he knew about the case until he 
spoke to Rolan’s attorney in 1996.  He stated that he did not 
tell police officers at the scene what he knew and did not 
reach out to family members of either Rolan or the victim to 
say that he had additional information.  It was not until he 
saw Rolan in jail, that he decided to reveal his version of the 
events to Rolan’s counsel – thirteen years later.          
The Commonwealth’s attempts to undermine Vargas’s 
testimony were important because Vargas provided testimony 
that conflicted with the Commonwealth’s theory of the case.  
According to the Commonwealth, his failure to come 
forward, or otherwise support Rolan’s self-defense theory at 
the initial trial, had adverse implications regarding his 
credibility.  However, the statements complained of were not 
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the only means by which the prosecution attacked Vargas’s 
credibility.  In fact, the jury was faced with other evidence 
that undermined Vargas’s self-defense testimony (e.g., the 
fact that no knife was found at the crime scene despite his 
testimony that Paulino came charging in with a knife and the 
testimony of other witnesses supporting the Commonwealth’s 
theory of the case).  See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66 (“When a 
defendant contends that a prosecutor’s question rendered his 
trial fundamentally unfair, it is important as an initial matter 
to place the remark in context.” (internal quotation marks, 
brackets, and citation omitted)).   
The trial court also provided an instruction to cure any 
prejudice raised by the prosecutor’s closing arguments.  App. 
at 1236a (“Ladies and gentlemen, Daniel Vargas was known 
to both the Commonwealth and the defense at the time of the 
prior proceedings in 1984.  However, prior defense counsel 
failed to call Daniel Vargas at the earlier proceeding in 
1984.”).  In light of the other evidence and the court’s 
curative instruction, the denial of Rolan’s due process claim 
based on the prosecutor’s comments about Vargas was 
neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Greer.   
Second, Rolan alleges prosecutorial misconduct based 
on the prosecutor’s comments regarding his failure to 
previously raise a self-defense theory of the case.  The 
prosecutor stated:  
They claim self defense.  Twenty-four 
years later they claim self defense.  Where was 
the self defense in May of 1983?  Where was 
the self defense for the five months that that 
man was a fugitive from the law?  Where was 
the self defense when he went to Brooklyn and 
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hid out until the police caught him? . . . .  
. . . . Self defense?  What does he do?  
Does he contact the police?  Does he call them 
on the phone?  Does he surrender himself?  
Does he get a lawyer?  No.  He runs and he 
hides.  
. . . . Where was the self defense in 1984 
when these proceedings were going on and the 
witnesses were being called to testify? . . . .  
. . . . He never contacted the police, never 
got a lawyer, never surrendered, never called 
911. . . . [A]t some point do you call the police 
and tell them, look, I killed somebody, I had to, 
he had a knife, I had no choice, he was going to 
stab me.  That call never came.  Never came.  
When they did catch the defendant in 
November of ‘83, they brought him back to 
Philadelphia and they processed him and they 
told him multiple times, you are being charged 
with the murder of Paulino Santiago, sir, you 
are being charged with his murder.  And the 
only statement he made was, “I know I need 
help.”  That’s it.  That’s it.  “I know I need 
help.”  That’s it.    
App. at 1107a-1110a, 1162a.  In granting Rolan’s first 
petition for habeas corpus, we held that Goldstein’s failure to 
investigate and put forward a self-defense theory was 
objectively unreasonable.  See Rolan, 445 F.3d at 682 
(“Although the decision to forgo a self-defense claim is of the 
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type that may be entitled to a presumption of validity, 
Goldstein’s decision not to present the defense cannot be 
according [sic] the normal deference to strategic choices 
because it was uninformed.”).   
Rolan now objects to the prosecutor’s comments, 
arguing that they implied that Rolan did not assert a self-
defense theory at trial because it was a fabrication, not 
because of his ineffective trial counsel.  The prosecutor’s 
comments about Rolan’s failure to previously assert self-
defense were not so injurious so as to result in a due process 
violation under Greer.9
                                                     
9 We apply AEDPA deference to this claim as it was 
adjudicated on the merits by the Superior Court.   
 The statements were a permissible 
attack on Rolan’s credibility.  The prosecutor discussed 
Rolan’s failure to assert self-defense alongside other 
evidence, such as his flight to New York after the shooting, to 
allow the jury to determine the reliability of his testimony that 
he acted in self-defense.   Rolan attempts to characterize 
Vargas’s unavailability at the initial trial and Rolan’s failure 
to assert self-defense as resting solely on Goldstein’s 
ineffectiveness.  However, it is impossible for us at this 
juncture to know what would have happened if Goldstein had 
effectively investigated Vargas as a potential witness and 
whether or not Vargas’s corroboration had any impact on 
Rolan’s failure to otherwise assert self-defense.  As the 
Superior Court previously stated, our prior determination of 
ineffectiveness does not grant Rolan both a new trial and 
“virtual immunity from any challenge to the credibility of his 
self-defense claim.”  Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 
410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).   
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Because the trial court provided an instruction 
explaining why evidence of Rolan’s self-defense theory was 
not previously presented and because there is other evidence 
in the record to further discredit Rolan’s assertion of self-
defense, the Superior Court’s holding that the prosecutor’s 
comments did not result in a due process violation was 
neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Greer.  
We will affirm the District Court’s denial of federal habeas 
relief on this ground.  
Third, Rolan asserts prosecutorial misconduct based on 
a number of alleged misstatements of the evidence in the 
prosecutor’s closing argument.  According to Rolan, the 
prosecutor articulated discrepancies between Vargas’s 
affidavit and his PCRA testimony that did not exist.  
Specifically, Rolan argues that the prosecutor erroneously 
claimed that Vargas’s affidavit stated that the Santiago 
brothers and Rolan all went into the house together.  He also 
alleges that the prosecutor misstated evidence by referencing 
Vargas’s testimony about Paulino Santiago entering the house 
with a knife and then stating that Vargas failed to include 
facts about the knife in his original affidavit.  Additionally, 
Rolan claims that the prosecutor mischaracterized the 
following:  Rosado’s testimony about if and when he saw 
Rolan with the murder weapon; whether the 911 caller saw 
Rolan enter the house with a rifle; and the amount of time and 
extent of the police’s search of the house.  Finally, he avers 
that the prosecutor improperly emphasized the consistency of 
Francisco Santiago’s statement to the police with his 
preliminary hearing and trial testimonies despite the trial 
court’s ruling that the police statement was inadmissible.  Not 
surprisingly, the Commonwealth asserts that the prosecutor’s 
statements were fair and proper arguments within the context 
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of the trial.   
Considering these statements within the context of the 
case, we find no constitutional violation.10  Rather, the record 
indicates that the alleged misstatements were either supported 
by other statements in the record or acceptable arguments 
based on the trial testimony and the defense’s arguments.11
                                                     
10 Although the Superior Court did not specifically address 
each alleged misstatement (and alternatively held that these 
claims were procedurally defaulted), it concluded that 
Rolan’s cumulative impact argument regarding the alleged 
misstatements lacked merit.  For this reason, we apply 
AEDPA deference to this claim. 
  
11 Our review of the record comports with the District Court’s 
analysis, which we adopt in affirming its decision to deny 
habeas relief based on the prosecutor’s alleged 
misrepresentations: 
The credibility of Daniel Vargas’[s] 
testimony was thoroughly addressed by both 
sides.  Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor 
made several misstatements concerning his 
testimony in his closing argument.  During his 
argument, the prosecutor reviewed Vargas’[s] 
testimony and compared it to his affidavit, 
pointing out discrepancies.  He also argued that 
Vargas had opportunity to tell the police what 
he knew about the murder of Paulin[o] Santiago 
prior to 1996; however, he did not do so.  This 
was a fair argument.  
 Mr. Rolan also claims that the prosecutor 
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argued that Edwin Rosado saw Petitioner with 
the rifle at the same time of the shooting, and 
called it a blatant misrepresentation of the 
evidence.  The record reveals that that is not 
exactly what the prosecutor said; he was 
properly commenting on the evidence presented 
at trial.  It was also a fair response to defense 
counsel’s statement of the evidence.  
 Additionally, Petitioner claims that the 
prosecutor misrepresented both the context and 
the content of the 911 call.  These alleged 
misrepresentations were logical arguments and 
inferences from the evidence.  Moreover, the 
911 call was played for the jury during 
summation, allowing the jury to make their own 
inferences from the call. 
Mr. Rolan further complained that the 
prosecutor misrepresented the evidence by 
saying the house was searched for 3 ½ hours.  
The inadequacy of the crime scene was brought 
up in the defense closing, to which the 
prosecutor appropriately responded.   
 Francisco Santiago’s statement to police 
being mentioned in the prosecution’s closing is 
another subject with which Mr. Rolan has taken 
issue.  Though the statement was mentioned, 
the court sustained [Rolan]’s objection made at 
the time, and the statement was never admitted 
into evidence.  The remarks of the prosecutor 
concerning Francisco Santiago were in response 
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Further, the trial court provided adequate instruction to cure 
any harm caused by the prosecutor’s characterizations of the 
evidence.  It instructed the jury to rely on the evidence 
presented at trial and to form their opinions of the case based 
on their independent recollections of the testimony, not the 
arguments of counsel.12
                                                                                                                       
to defense counsel’s comments in his closing 
about Mr. Santiago’s credibility. 
  The Superior Court’s holding that 
Rolan v. Coleman, No. 2:08-cv-05438, slip op. at 41 n.20 
(D.N.J. July 30, 2010). 
12 The trial court provided the following instruction: 
 As I’ve told you before, what counsel 
says is not evidence.  But even though these 
statements do not constitute evidence, you 
should consider them very carefully.  In their 
closing statements, counsel will call to your 
attention the evidence that they consider 
material and will ask you to draw certain 
inferences from that evidence. 
 Ladies and gentlemen, please keep in 
mind, however, that you’re not bound by 
counsel’s recollection of the evidence.  It is 
your recollection of the evidence and your 
recollection alone which must guide you during 
your deliberations.  If there is a discrepancy 
between counsel’s recollection and your 
recollection, you’re bound by your own 
recollection . . . . 
App. at 1043a-44a. 
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the prosecutor’s comments did not result in a due process 
violation was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 
application of, Greer.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Rolan’s petition for habeas corpus on the basis of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
B.  Fifth Amendment Claim  
Rolan further avers that the prosecutor’s comments 
about his post-arrest silence violated his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.13
                                                     
13 This claim was adjudicated on the merits; therefore, we 
apply AEDPA deference to the Superior Court’s 
determinations.  See Horn, 570 F.3d at 115.   
  The Fifth Amendment 
guarantees “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. V.  The Supreme Court has recognized that where a 
prosecutor, on his own initiative, asks a jury to draw an 
adverse inference from a Mirandized criminal defendant’s 
post-arrest silence or to treat that defendant’s silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt, the defendant’s privilege 
against self-incrimination is violated.  Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (“We hold that the use for impeachment 
purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after 
receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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During trial, the prosecutor stated:  
 
When they did catch the defendant in 
November of ‘83, they brought him back to 
Philadelphia and they processed him and they 
told him multiple times, you are being charged 
with the murder of Paulino Santiago . . . . And 
the only statement he made was, “I know I need 
help.”  That’s it. That’s it.  “I know I need 
help.”  That’s it.    
 
App. at 1162a.  Rolan characterizes this statement as a 
comment on his failure to make a specific statement (i.e., the 
fact that he was silent on the matter).  However, the record 
clearly indicates that the prosecutor did not comment on 
Rolan’s post-arrest silence, but rather on the substance and 
limited nature of what he did say.  Neither the Fifth 
Amendment nor Doyle shield a defendant from a prosecutor’s 
comments about statements made to the police.  Therefore, 
the Superior Court’s decision to deny Rolan’s claim on this 
ground was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 
Supreme Court precedent as stated in Doyle.14
                                                     
14 We note that the District Court did not apply explicitly 
AEDPA deference in reviewing this claim.  Rather, it 
identified Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) as the 
relevant Supreme Court precedent and reviewed the state 
court’s resolution for reasonable application.  To that point, 
we, first, find Doyle to be more applicable to this case, as the 
Griffin analysis most pointedly addresses a prosecutor’s 
  We will 
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affirm the District Court’s denial of Rolan’s petition for 
habeas corpus for violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
C.  Confrontation Clause 
Because Francisco Santiago died before Rolan’s 
retrial, the transcript of his testimony from Rolan’s original 
trial and his preliminary hearing was read into evidence.  
Rolan now argues that the trial court’s decision to admit 
Santiago’s testimony violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause because he was deprived of an adequate 
cross-examination of the witness.15
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the 
Supreme Court held that out-of-court testimonial statements 
may not be offered against a defendant at trial unless the 
declarant of the statement is unavailable and the defendant 
had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  Id. at 68 
(“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
  Because we find no 
constitutional error, we reject Rolan’s position that the 
Santiago testimony should be struck from the record and a 
retrial granted.      
                                                                                                                       
adverse comments about a defendant’s failure to testify at 
trial.  Second, to the extent that the reasonable application 
review is separate from AEDPA, we refuse to adopt such a 
standard of review in favor of AEDPA deference.   
15 This claim was adjudicated on the merits; therefore, we 
apply AEDPA deference to the Superior Court’s 
determinations.  See Horn, 570 F.3d at 115.   
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examination.”).  We now must consider whether the Superior 
Court’s determination that admitting Francisco Santiago’s 
testimony at trial did not violate Rolan’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause is contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, Crawford.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
In Rolan’s first habeas corpus proceeding, we held that 
his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective by 
failing to investigate Rolan’s self-defense theory and failing 
to call two witnesses in support of that theory.  Rolan now 
argues that his prior counsel was ineffective in his cross-
examination of Francisco Santiago because prior counsel did 
not question him about inconsistent statements or explore a 
grant of immunity given by the Commonwealth.  The parties 
do not dispute the fact that Rolan cross-examined Francisco 
Santiago when he testified at the first trial.  The issue here is 
whether prior counsel’s cross-examination of Francisco 
Santiago was adequate under Crawford despite our previous 
finding that counsel was ineffective for other reasons.  We 
hold that it was more than adequate. 
Crawford does not provide a specific standard for 
determining whether a defendant had an opportunity to cross-
examine a witness, but it does suggest that the prior 
opportunity must be adequate.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57 
(“Our later cases conform to [the holding in Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)] that prior trial or preliminary 
hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine.” ).  As the Supreme 
Court has previously stated, “the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not 
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish.”  Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam).   
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In analyzing Rolan’s initial ineffectiveness claim, the 
Superior Court found that prior counsel’s cross examination 
“established that both Santiago brothers had been drinking 
heavily, that the abandoned house was without electricity and 
therefore dark, that the victim’s girlfriend had recently left 
him for Appellant, and that despite [Francisco] Santiago’s 
claim that Appellant demanded money, he did not stop to take 
any cash from either brother.”  Rolan, 964 A.2d at 409.  It 
also noted that both Goldstein and the prosecutor asked 
whether either Francisco or Paulino Santiago had a weapon.  
Id. (“Regarding the self-defense theory, counsel, like the 
prosecutor, did ask whether either brother has a weapon”).  It 
also specifically addressed Rolan’s claim that Francisco 
Santiago was not adequately cross-examined by Goldstein 
because Goldstein did not fully explore his immunity 
agreement with the Commonwealth and concluded that it was 
a baseless argument.16
                                                     
16 In doing so, the Superior Court noted that Francisco 
Santiago’s testimony at the preliminary hearing (before 
making the agreement with the Commonwealth) was 
consistent with his trial testimony.  Those consistencies 
combined with the fact that the jury was aware of his criminal 
record indicated that additional disclosure of the immunity 
agreement would have been of little consequence as 
impeachment evidence.  Rolan, 964 A.2d at 407. 
  There is no Supreme Court precedent 
to suggest that Goldstein’s cross-examination was inadequate, 
and the record does not support such a conclusion.  
Consequently, the Superior Court’s finding was not contrary 
to, or an unreasonable application of, Crawford.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of Rolan’s writ of habeas 
corpus on this ground.    
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V.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order denying Rolan’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  
